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Compensatory Contempt to Collect Money
DOUG RENDLEMAN*

This Article examines three lawsuits that raise basic questions about
contempt and its relation to analogous doctrines. The more precise issue it
analyzes is when to substitute compensatory contempt for the usual
devices that creditors use to search for and capture debtors' assets. The
judgment collection system is creaky and hard to operate, partly because it
protects debtors and third parties and partly because it retains esoteric
distinctions, hypertechnical refinements, and archaic mannerisms. Thus,
creditors resort to lesser known but more expeditious equitable devices
like compensatory contempt. Before examining the lawsuits, the Article
will develop some
BACKGROUND.

Judges possess two primary tools to enforce private rights: money
judgments and injunctions. In the main, judgments and injunctions are
enforced differently. Judgment creditors use writs of execution to collect
judgments from debtors' property without involving the debtors
personally. On the other hand, defendants who are enjoined are
constrained to comport their conduct to the injunction's dictates; and if
they disdain to obey, judges fine and imprison to coerce them to conform.
Observers thus say the law acts in rem, equity in personam. The foregoing
legal and equitable roles, however, may be reversed. 1 Equity creditors may
use legal devices such as execution to collect money from equitable
defendants. When execution, the legal remedy, proves to be inadequate,
the judgment creditor may summon the debtor to an interrogatory or
supplementary proceeding or file a creditor's bill; and the judge may enter
personal orders, for example, to coerce testimony and conveyances or to
enjoin transfers. 2
If a plaintiff's damage remedy is inadequate, the judge enjoins to
allow the plaintiff to enjoy the rights in fact. When judges order defendants
to do or refrain from doing something, they may use coercive contempt to
secure the fruits of victory for the plaintiff. When, however, a defendant
violates an injunction or other order, the judge, finding that it is too late to
coerce obedience, has two retrospective remedies. The first is criminal
contempt to punish the defendant and to vindicate the public interest in
seeing that court orders are obeyed. The second is compensatory

* Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. The author thanks Jean Wyant and Neil Berkhoff for helping him with this article.
I. See generally Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 CoLUM. L. REv. 37, 106 (1915).
2. V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 86-108 (1974).
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contempt, the subject of this study. Compensatory contempt salvages
something for the plaintiff by awarding the money originally concluded to
have been inadequate. The judge attempts to formulate a money remedy
for the plaintiff around the central irony that if money had been a
satisfactory remedy, he would not have enjoined in the first place.
The choice between compensatory contempt and creditor process
involves general issues about collecting money judgments, preventing
imprisonment for civil debt, and protecting third parties from creditor
process. The choice of collection devices also raises issues about enforcing
orders in regulatory and structural litigation; and it tests how strongly we
believe in the substantive basis of these orders. Comparing enforcement
techniques forces us to encounter again the conundrum: when will judges
conclude that money is inadequate and order conduct? Imperfect
performance by lawyers conceals answers to the foregoing and interposes
questions about holding clients to counsel's decisions. More fundamentally, this Article asks basic questions about judicial power; for throughout
these lawsuits the limited government model competes with the archetype
of judicial power as a roving commission to improve society by righting
wrongs.
An inevitable tension courses through contempt decisions. How
much power does the legislature possess to control contempt? Should
judges construe the federal contempt statute strictly, accepting its
historical background3 and restrictive language?4 Or faced with actual
injustice, should the judge construe the statute liberally, searching for
implied or inchoate orders, constructive custody, and anticipatory breach?
This is the view Chief Justice Fuller attacked when he was quoted as having
said: "Brother B would codify all laws in an act of two sections: 1st, all
people must be good; 2d, courts of equity are hereby given full power and
authority to enforce the provisions of this act.'' 5
All three lawsuits involve the relation between trial and appellate
courts. Normally, if a successful trial court plaintiff secures a money
judgment and defendant appeals, defendant posts a supersedeas bond.
When the judge approves the bond, he stays execution. This stay stops the
plaintiff from enforcing the judgment against defendant's assets. 6 If the
3. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
"Inferior" Federal Courts, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010 (1924).
4. 18 u.s.c. § 401 (1976).
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
5. Gregory, Government by Injunction, II HARV. L. REv. 487, 510 (1898).
6. FED. R. C1v. P. 62(d); FED. R. APP. P. 8(a).
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appellate court affirms, the plaintiff may recover from the bond. 7 An
injunction in favor of a successful plaintiff, however, will not be stayed
automatically when defendant appeals. Injunctions are suspended only if
either the trial or appellate court orders them stayed or the appellate court
grants an appellate injunction. Either court may condition the stay on a
bond. Unstayed injunctions continue to be effective; if the trial judge
refuses to enjoin and plaintiff appeals without securing a stay or
injunction, defendant r_nay do what plaintiff sought to prevent. 8

I.

Berry v. Midtown Service Corp.

Our first lawsuit grew out of a judgment for plaintiff in a wrongful
death action. Defendant was granted a twenty day stay of execution to
decide whether to appeal. During the stay, defendant "denuded itself of
substantially all its assets by transferring them to various affiliated
corporations."9 The court of appeals held that the conduct of the debtor
and the transferees was not contempt: under the federal contempt statute a
judgment debtor who succeeds in staying execution without posting bond
and then, during the period of the stay, transfers all assets does not commit
contempt that would lead to a compensatory award for the damages that
plaintiff sustained. 10 There was no injunction, the judgment debtor did not
stipulate anything, and the stay that restrained the creditor did not
implicitly order the debtor to keep enough assets to satisfy the judgment.
The court strictly construed the federal contempt statute, which allows a
judge to punish "misconduct" that occurs in or close to the courtroom but
restricts out-of-court contempt to violations of "any lawful writ, process,
order, rule, decree, or command," 11 to mean that unless specific property
was dissipated "a party must have violated an express court order before he
can be punished for contempt. . . ." 12 The Berry court, rejecting more
liberal constructions of the New York contempt statute 13 in favor of
legislative control, 14 refused to convert a trial judge's necessary power to
maintain order in a courtroom into a roving commission to punish out-ofcourt misconduct.
Admittedly, the judgment debtor's transfers hindered the plaintiff's
efforts to collect the judgment. The creditor has two other remedies: she
could have demanded a supersedeas bond; and she may yet pursue the
7. II C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2905 (1973).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c); FED. R.APP.P.8; II C. WRIGHT&A. MILLER,FEDERALPRACTICEAND
PROCEDURE§ 2904 (1973).
9. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 308 U.S. 536,
dismissed per stipulation of counsel, 308 U.S. 629 (1939).
10. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939).
II. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1976).
12. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1939).
13. N.Y. JuD. LAW§ 773 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
14. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1939).
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assets as fraudulent conveyances. 15 Having neglected to obtain
supersedeas, however, plaintiff finds contempt to be a "sharper, swifter
remedy" than fraudulent conveyance, particularly if the court uses
coercive imprisonment to collect the compensatory award. 16 The Berry
court wisely precluded the judgment creditor from converting the money
judgment into a compensatory contempt award.
II.

THE GREEN VALLEY CREAMERY

Let's examine how well the Berry result wears in litigation to carry out
governmental policies. The first controversy to review is the marathon
Parker contempt. Howard Parker and Green Valley Creamery fought the
New Deal's Agricultural Marketing legislation, which required Parker to
pay the government quite a bit of money, to the last ditch. The trial judge
enjoined Green Valley Creamery to comply and ordered Parker to pay all
the money then owed and thereafter due. The appellate court stayed the
trial judge's order but required Parker to deposit the amount assertedly
due into the district court's registry to abide the final result. Instead of
depositing the money, Parker siphoned milk through another company,
Stuart Milk. Stuart Milk skimmed off the excess before returning the milk
to Green Valley. This disabled Green Valley from depositing the money.
When the court of appeals held that the government won the litigation,
Green Valley filed voluntary bankruptcy.
The government proceeded against Parker for contempt. Contempt
was refused for two reasons: Stuart Milk was not a party, and the
government was thinking about coercive rather than compensatory
contempt. Judge Magruder rescued the government case at this stage by
suggesting that the contempt remedy be compensatory contempt, a
monetary fine payable to the government. 17
Something had to be done. Parker had churned the assets sufficiently
to disable Green Valley from paying; and then he argued that this success
exonerated him from contempt. Without a compensatory award, Judge
Magruder said, coercive imprisonment "would be ridiculously ineffective
as a remedial process, for it is idle to put Parker in jail to make him cause
Green Valley to do something it is no longer capable of doing." 18
Moreover, jailing Parker until a money award was paid would, if he was
unable to pay, be imprisonment to collect a civil debt. Judge Magruder did
suggest, however, that the trial judge might imprison Parker to coerce
payment of a compensatory award. History records that the government
15. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, Ill (2d Cir. 1939).
16. I G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PERFERENCES § 74a (rev. ed. 1940). See a/so
Note, Transfer of Assets Pending Stay of Execution as Contempt of Court, 49 YALE LJ. 580, 581
(1940).
17. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1942).
18. /d.
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took the good judge's advice. 19 The trial judge entered a compensatory
award. Parker evaded the compensatory award and escaped from coercive
imprisonment by filing individual bankruptcy and successfully discharg.mg the compensatory award .20
In addition to misplacing compensatory contempt, the government
failed to pursue standard creditors' remedies, particularly in the separate
voluntary bankruptcies of Green Valley Creamery and Howard Parker. As
Judge Magruder strongly hints/ 1 the way Green Valley-Parker used
Stuart Milk to skim the government's money off the milk meant that the
government very likely could recover the money. Perhaps Stuart Milk held
the money as constructive trustee for the government. 22 The government
could not use contempt against Stuart Milk, a nonparty, but an action to
impress the property with a constructive trust and to order Stuart Milk and
responsible officers, such as Parker, to pay was clearly available. 23 The
government, however, probably did not need a constructive trust remedy
but only to measure by defendants' gain; thus it could have sued Stuart
Milk and Parker for money had and received. 24
As Judge Magruder also hinted, Green Valley Creamery's creditors
may have been able to recover the money from Stuart Milk as a fraudulent
19. Parker v. United States, 135 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 737 (1943).
20. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66 (1st Cir. 1946).
21. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 377-78 (1st Cir. 1942).
22. REsTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION§ 168(2) (1936).
23. RESTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION§ 160, comment e, (1936).
24. Klass v. Twin City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 291 Minn. 68, 190 N.W. 2d 493 (1971) (money
paid to defendant by a third person belongs to plaintiff). A plaintiff has two similar remedies. First, the
plaintiff may sue to recover money that the defendant has received from a third party and that in good
conscience belongs to the plaintiff, seeking a money judgment measured by the defendant's gain.
Second, the plaintiff may ask the judge to hold that the defendant retains the money as a constructive
trustee. The money received action comports better with the prohibition against debt imprisonment
than the constructive trust action. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to assure specie recovery.
Before a judge will impose a constructive trust, a plaintiff must show that the trust res exists; then the
judge will order the defendant in personam to convey it. The judge may enforce the order to convey
with contempt in the form of coercive imprisonment. REsTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 160, commenff,
comment e (1936). These features coordinate constructive trusts with the idea that using coercive
contempt to enforce an equitable order to pay money violates the prohibition against debt
imprisonment. The judge cannot imprison contemnor to coerce the impossible, for example, to pay
money the contemnor no longer possesses or controls. Knaus v. Knaus, 387 Pa. 370, 127 A.2d 669
(1956). The judge can imprison contemnor to obtain a specific, existing item, for example a
constructive trust res, without imprisoning for a civil debt. Ex parte Ridgley, 261 Mich. 42,245 N.W.
803 (1932); Carnahan v. Carnahan, 143 Mich. 390,107N.W. 73,75 (1906). Butimprisoningcontemnor
to enforce an order directing payment of a certain amount to a creditor incarcerates to collect a civil
debt. Potter v. Wilson, 609 P.2d 1278 (Okla. 1980); Kidd v. Virginia Safe Deposit & Trust Corp., 113
Va. 612,75 S.E. 145 (1912); I G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 239 at414
n.67 (rev. ed. 1940). Writers use the term constructive trust when they need only ask for measurement
by defendant's gain. See, e.g., Kronman, Specific Peiformance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 376-82 ( 1978).
Schwartz, The Case for Specific Peiformance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 290 n.54 (1979). This overstatement is
harmless unless someone imprisons a defendant to execute a nonexistent constructive trust res.
Similarly, for reasons given above, Judge Magruder erred when he suggested coercive imprisonment to
collect compensatory contempt from Parker. Unless the government showed that the money actually
existed, an order requiring Parker to pay enforced with coercive imprisonment would imprison Parker
for a civil debt. But cf White v. Wadhams, 211 Mich. 658, 179 N.W. 245 (1920) (coercive contempt
approved [incorrectly] to collect money spent).
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conveyance. 25 The master found and the court accepted that Parker and
Stuart Milk disabled Green Valley from paying to hinder and delay the
government's efforts to collect from Green Valley. 26 The conveyances were
intended to and did diminish Green Valley's assets so that it was unable to
pay the government. The transactions between Green Valley and Stuart
Milk possess several fraudulent appearing aspects: a defendant conveyed
for inadequate consideration during a lawsuit; the conveyance left the
defendant without enough assets to pay the judgment; the nonparty
transferee was owned and controlled by the people who controlled the
defendant; and the transferee emerged with roughly the amount of the
judgment. 27 In short, the transactions diminished Green Valley's assets so
that it was unable to pay the judgment. 28 The government or another
Green Valley creditor may have been able to recover this money from
Stuart Milk in a fraudulent conveyance action under state law29 or Green
Valley's bankruptcy trustee may have recovered the sums to benefit its
creditors. 30
It is not clear why the government pursued Parker through contempt
rather than following standard creditor process. The bar to contempt in
Berry did not exist, for Parker's conduct also violated an explicit court
order. By this time, the government attorneys may have allowed revenge to
take precedence over self-interest. In any event, the government eventually
filed a claim in Parker's bankruptcy, collected a dividend of almost $2,000,
and attempted unsuccessfully to bar discharge of the remaining
$20,286.58. 31 If the government had upset the Stuart Milk transfer earlier
under a constructive trust, money had and received, or fraudulent
conveyance theory, the author speculates that the government would have
received more. Moreover, if the government had instituted involuntary
bankruptcy against Parker and shown that he had conveyed fraudulently,
Parker would have been stripped of his assets, yet his discharge would have
been barred and he would have been exposed to criminal prosecution. 32
Perhaps bankruptcy was the better road to revenge, for contempt turned
out to possess unanticipated humane attributes.
25. Parker v. United States, 126 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1942).
26. !d.
27. 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§§ 298, 319,339, 340 (rev. ed.
1940).
28. !d. at § 275.
29. In 1924 Massachusetts had adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. MAss. ANN.
LAwsch.l09A§§ l-14(Law. Co-op.l975). The transactions probably violated§§ 6 & 7.
30. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 67(d)(2)(c), (d), 11 U.S.C. 107(d)(2)(c), (d)(l976)(repealed 1979).
11 U.S.C. app. § 548 (Supp. II 1978). By the time Parker filed personal bankruptcy, the fraudulent
conveyance action was apparently time barred.
31. Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 1946). The government had recovered
$20,000 on a supersedeas bond posted on appeal from the district court's compensatory contempt
order. /d.
32. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 3(a)(l), 11 U.S.C. § 2l(a)(l) (1976) (repealed 1979); Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 § 14(c)(l), (4), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(l), (4)(1976)(repealed 1979); 18 U.S.C. § 152(1976).
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More often, however, a compensatory contempt award for violating
orders to pay will prejudice the defendant. The award might evade the
statute of limitations and other protections in the formal collection
scheme. If the contempt creditor may use coercive imprisonment to collect
the compensatory award, the award may defeat the debtor's exemptions,
squeeze payment from the debtor's family and friends, and allow the
contempt creditor to receive a larger percentage than the debtor's other
creditors.
III.

Griffin v. Prince Edward County

The Griffin compensatory contempt grew out of opposition to a
public policy more fundamental than milk marketing. After prolonged
and bitter opposition to desegregating the local schools, the Prince
Edward County, Virginia, Board of Supervisors ceased to operate public
schools. 33 In their place, ostensibly private schools were operated for white
children funded largely by tuition grants to parents. The Supreme Court
affirmed a district court injunction ordering the Board to reopen the
public schools. 34 The district judge, after receiving the mandate, ordered
the Board to open the schools.
Plaintiffs asked the district judge to enjoin the Board from processing
tuition grants for the private schools. The district judge, however, refused
to enjoin the Board from paying grants for 1964-65, the coming school
year. Plaintiffs filed notice of appeal and sought to accelerate the appeal,
but they omitted to seek a stay or an appellate injunction forbidding the
Board from disbursing the money pending the appellate decision. The
Chief Judge of the court of appeals asked the Board to agree not to pay
grants before the court decided the appeal. The Board refused. The same
night was an eventful one: The court of appeals clerk was told that the
Board refused to stipulate. The Board met, voted to enlarge the grants for
the coming year, ordered the grants paid, notified white parents, and
disbursed $180,000 in checks. Most of the payee-parents cashed the checks
before 9 A.M. the following day. 35
The district court and the court of appeals enjoined the Board to cease
tuition grants for children in segregated public schools. The court of
appeals held that the way in which the Board paid the 1964-65 grants
constituted contempt, and it ordered the Board or its members to repay the
money. 36 Possible creditors' remedies will be discussed before returning to
contempt.
Knowing that a stay or appellate injunction would probably follow its

u.s.

33.
34.
35.
960
36.

See genera/(1•, B. SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS (1965).
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
Griffin v. County School Board, 363 F.2d 206,208 (4th Cir. 1966)(en bane), cert. denied, 385
(1966).
Griffin v. County School Board, 363 F.2d 206,212 (4th Cir. 1966).
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refusal to stipulate, the Board disbursed the funds. Commentators agree
that prejudgment gifts or transfers that leave defendants unable to pay
judgments are fraudulent conveyances vulnerable to an action by
claimants as subsequent creditors. 37 Transactions by which both
transferor and transferee intend to hinder transferor's creditors are always
fraudulent. 38
Were the Griffin plaintiffs, black students and citizens, protected
under the fraudulent conveyance act from a transfer of public money to
people who were not entitled to it? The plaintiffs were the ultimate
benficiaries of the funds. The original fraudulent conveyance act of 1571
condemned conveyances which injured "creditors and others," and the
Virginia statute that is based upon it protects creditors and "other persons"
against conveyances intended to defraud. 39 Plaintiffs may have become
creditors by suing Board members for damages for dispersing money
illegally and depriving them of equal protection of the law under color of
an unconstitutional state law. 40
Plaintiffs in Griffin, moreover, could have resorted to a taxpayers'
action if they found it strained to think of themselves as creditors or
"others" under the fraudulent conveyance statute. The Virginia court had
held that supervisors who had been overcompensated could be enjoined
from continuing the practice and required to restore the illegal payments.41
This remedy resembles an action for money received or imposing a
constructive trust on funds wrongfully paid by a trustee, and a court may
order people who received the misappropriated funds to return them.42
The white parents must have known what was in the air that evening, and
the court might have ordered them to repay the money. 43
The recipients may have been vulnerable to another action to repay
the grants they received. The white parents who received the money might
well have held as constructive trustees for the ultimate beneficiaries. A
fiduciary who transfers in violation of a duty to beneficiaries will discover
that the recipient takes the property subject to the beneficiaries' interest.44
If the funds no longer existed or if an in personam order was unnecessary,
the beneficiaries could have sued the recipients for money had and
received, seeking a money judgment measured by defendants' gain.
The Griffin transfer also may be discussed by analogy to two latin37. Berryv. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107, Ill (2d Cir. 1939); Twynes Case, 76Eng. Rep.
809 (K.B. 1601); 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§ 339 (rev. ed. 1940).
38. Lipman v. Norman Packing Co., 146 Va. 461,467, 131 S.E. 797,798 (1926); Click v. Green,
77 Va. 827, 836-38 (1883); Henderson v. Hunton, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 926, 933 (1875).
39. VA. CoDE § 55-80 (1974).
40. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1976).
41. Johnson v. Black, 103 Va. 477, 49 S.E. 633 (1905). See Hill, Tort and Contract Claims
Against Counties, 7 WM. & MARY L. REv 61 (1966).
42. Jackson v. Norris, 72 Ill. 364 (1874).
43. 65 MICH. L. REV. 1490, 1501 (1967).
44. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 168(1) (1936).
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named doctrines, lis pendens and in custodia legis. In actions concerning
specific, described real property, lis pendens means that purchasers or
transferees of the property during litigation take the property subject to the
result of the litigation.45 Virginia courts, particularly federal courts,
follow, or at one time followed, the idea that statutory lis pendens does not
abolish common law lis pendens; and lis pendens, the courts said, applies
even though plaintiff fails to file notice and even to personal property
transferred during litigation. 46
Property in the court's "custody" because attached, garnished, under
a receiver, or in an insolvent estate is subject to the outcome of the lawsuit.
Property may come into judicial custody when an action is filed, and the
doctrine may operate whether there is actual or constructive notice. 47 One
who interferes with property in custodia legis may be held in contempt.48
The fictional custody serves the same useful purpose as lis pendens: it keeps
a potential loser from impairing the winner's benefits. Both these doctrines
produce results similar to a money received theory or deciding that the
recipients held the property as constructive trustees. 49
The court of appeals found the Board guilty of contempt, utilizing a
theory resembling in custodia legis. The Board, fully aware of what it was
doing, interfered with property in the court's custody, put the subject
matter of litigation beyond the court's reach, and destroyed the appellate
court's ability to afford full relief to plaintiffs. The court held that the
appeal was a "process" within the terms of the federal contempt statute and
that defendants' conduct set the process to naught: "the putting of the
subject-matter of this litigation beyond our reach was a defiance of this
court, an anticipatory resistance to its ultimate orders or process."50
The dissent is technically more sound. Rules and standard practice
allow courts to stay conduct pending appeal and to grant appellate
injunctions. 51 No operative order clearly defining the proscribed conduct
and promulgated prior to the conduct forbade defendants' actions. A
judge's request to stipulate is not a "lawful writ, process, order, rule,
45. \V. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY § 92 (2d ed. 1956); Note, Statutory Lis
Pendens, 20 IowA L. REv. 476 (1935).
46. Kingv. Davis, 137 F. 222,239 (W.D. Va. 1905),aff'dsubnom. Blankenshipv. King, 157 F.
676 (4th Cir. 1906); Steinmann v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 121 Va. 61 I, 641, 93 S.E. 684, 694 (1917).
47. Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U.S. 734,737 (1931); Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. I,
14 (1901).
48. Converse v. Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 1939); In re Coger, 340 F.
Supp. 612, 616 (W.D. Va. 1972) (Virginia law).
49. Technically: (I) in custodia legis leads to a personal order to restore the property, Converse v.
Highway Constr. Co., 107 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1939); (2) lis pendens creates a lien on the property which
the plaintiff may foreclose, 20 IowA L. REV. 476,483 (1935); (3) money received will result ina money
judgment enforcible by execution, RESTATEMENT oF RESTITUTION§ 166 comment b (1936); and, (4) a
judge will enter a personal order to the constructive trustee to execute the trust, by delivering the res to
the plaintiff beneficiary. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 168 (I) (1936).
50. Griffin v. County School Board, 363 F.2d 206, 2II (4th Cir. 1966).
51. FED. R. APP. P. 8(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 62(d).
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decree, or command." 52 Absent an order or even an application for an order, defendants were free to dissipate the funds. The issue was whether the
continuing program of tuition grants was constitutional; even after the
payment, the court could adjudicate that issue. 53 The majority opinion,
the dissent concluded, ignored Congress's limits on contempt and reverts
to an anachronistic conception of an unlimited, inherent contempt
power. 54
The contempt remedy in Griffin was a compensatory award of money.
Arguably, compensatory contempt should be approved when plaintiffs
could have used parallel legal remedies. 55 The court of appeals' result
resembles allowing a winning trial court defendant to proceed, but after
the appellate court reverses, telling her to pay for the harm done to the time
of judgment. Thus, observers who sympathize with a compensatory
contempt award in Griffin might feel quite differently about a punitive
remedy or about using coercive contempt to collect the award. The Board's
contemptuous transfer fits some creditors' remedies and is analogous to
others. Our legal system was designed, however, to protect traditional
forms of property and creditors rather than people claiming entitlements
to government benefits. Perhaps the courts should build on Griffin to
develop a new law of lis pendens-in custodia legis to aid their power to
award effective relief in "new property" and structural litigation. 56
Perhaps, finally, the court of appeals intended the compensatory award to
be a second injunction and perceived it as within its equitable power to
fashion a remedy to resolve the mess. 57
On the other hand, perhaps Berry teaches us that compensatory
contempt should not be expanded to encompass creditors' remedies. 58
These remedies have substantive and procedural limits developed over the
centuries to protect debtors and third parties. Further, they are embodied
in codes and decisions and are accessible to people with legal research
skills. Griffin-style compensatory contempt may be subject to abuses such
as lack of warning, violating the exemption statutes, ignoring statutes of
limitations, and injuring innocent third parties. Plaintiffs, under this view,
should utilize available creditor's techniques and leave compensatory
contempt within its traditional bounds.
More fundamentally, Griffin raises the perennial question whether
52. 18 u.s.c. § 401(3) (1976).
53. 52 IOWA L. REV. 582, 587 (1966).
54. Griffin v. County School Board, 363 F.2d 206, 215 (4th Cir. 1966).
55. 52 VA. L. REV. 1556, 1568 (1966).
56. United States v. DeLeon, 498 F.2d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1974); National Forest Preservation
Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408,411 (9th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. E.P.A., 485
F.2d 780, 784 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
57. United States v. Tunica County School Dist., 323 F. Supp. 1019(N.D. Miss. 1970),aff'dper
curiam, 440 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971).
58. Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939); Note, Transfer ofAssets Pending
Stay of Execution as Contempt of Court, 49 YALE L.J. 580 (1940).
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courts possess a roving commission under an inherent cont~mpt power or
whether the statutes define and limit what courts can do through
contempt. 59 In the face of massive resistance, remitting the black plaintiffs
to a creditor's action in state court sounds callous indeed. The court of
appeals responded to an outrage that perpetuated one of the most
egregious examples of a caste system and the failure of democratic
theory. 60
The proponents of compensatory contempt, however, must face the
question whether the court's liberal, even specious, reading of contempt
power under the statute is warranted. Old decisions that the majority read
to support the roving commission view of contempt61 may be less
meaningful today in light of changes in contempt on other fronts that
reveal a more structured and defined approach. 62 Also the weird and
fantastic bankruptcy jurisdiction distinctions that gave rise to the in
custodia legis theory of contempt for interfering with property in the
court's "custody" have been replaced with relatively clear and accessible
statutes. 63
IV.

CONCLUSION

The strict construction-roving commission division in contempt will
never be resolved. First, as Berry, Parker, and Griffin reveal, judicial
attitudes and activism, social and legal change, and litigant's conduct will
cause the issue to re-emerge in a new guise from time to time. Second,
perhaps because of the policy conflicts, contempt statutes are
anachronistic, incomplete, halting, and feeble. When legislatures respond
in an intellectually respectable fashion to the issues that contempt raises, 64
we will need to reexamine the question whether contempt is defined or
inherent. In the meantime, the author quotes Mr. Dunbar
that no course is more dangerous than to justify the exercise of a doubtful
power by the supposed necessities of a particular emergency. . . . It is no
light matter that suspicion even should rest upon the judiciary of warping
principles to meet the supposed exigencies of cases as to which the strongest
passion of the community are aroused. 65

The material produces more satisfactory answers to the more modest
59. Compare Berry v. Midtown Serv. Corp., 104 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1939) with Griffin v. County
School Board,363 F.2d206(4thCir.l966). Compare65 MICH. L. REV. 1490(1967) with 52 VA. L. REV.
1556, 1567-69 (1966).
60. 52 IOWA L. REV. 582,588 (1966); 52 VA. L. REv. 1556, 1569 (1966).
61. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S. 217 (1932); Merrimack River Sav. Bank v. City of Clay Center,
219 u.s. 527 (1911).
62. See, e.g., Bloom v. IJJinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (jury trial for serious criminal contempts).
63. Isaacs v. HobbsTie&TimberCo.,282 U.S. 734(1931); Muellerv. Nugent, 184 U.S.! (1901);
28 U.S.C.A. § 1471 (West Supp. 1980); I I t:.S.C. app. §§ 362,541,549 (Supp. II 1978). See generally
Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 3, 16-17 (1978).
64. 65 MICH. L. REV. 1490, 1502 (1967); 24 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 125, (1967).
65. Dunbar, Government by Injunction, 13 L.Q. REV. 347, 366-67 (1897).
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issues. Prudence compels us to respect at least the policy behind the
protections for debtors and others built into creditor process. Compensatory contempt should never be used when it will frustrate the exemption
statutes, the statute of limitations, or the ban on debt imprisonment. The
inadequacy prerequisite for an injunction attempts, albeit imperfectly, to
channel litigants into damage actions that are easier to adjudicate, less
harsh on losing defendants, and simpler to enforce. Simple bipolar actions
to recover money for past misconduct produce easier decisions to enforce
than complex structural reform that seeks to achieve adherence to the
Constitution and government regulation. If we believe in our Constitution
and in government regulation, we must formulate a unified and flexible
method to enforce these interests. It 'must avoid the extremes of excessive
leniency, which evidences an unsteady commitment to the substantive
standard, and draconian harshness, which converts respect into revenge
and may create sympathy for the refractory defendant. The blood of the
martyrs, the Romans learned, became the seed of the church. Moreover,
when the parties must live with each other after the decision, preserving
harmony may be more important than ali-or-nothing solutions. Judges
have a duty to decide all controversies correctly, but, as comparing Berry
with Parker and Griffin illustrates, their duty to overlook imperfect
presentation is greater when structural or regulatory litigation presents
public issues. In particular, we must beseech judges to maintain patience
and creativity coupled with skepticism about achieving perfect solutions
with blunt judicial remedies.

